Play in(g) International Theory by Hirst, Agnes Giovanna
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hirst, A. G. (Accepted/In press). Play in(g) International Theory. Review of International Studies.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
1 
 
Play in(g) International Theory 
Dr Aggie Hirst 
King’s College London 
aggie.hirst@kcl.ac.uk 
Review of International Studies 
Accepted 28.04.19 
 Forthcoming 2019 
 
Abstract 
While the study of games and gaming has increased in International Relations in recent years, a 
corresponding exploration of play has yet to be developed in the field. While play features in several 
key areas – including game theory, videogames and popular culture, and pedagogical role-plays and 
simulations – little work has been done to analyse its presence in, and potentials for, the discipline. 
The aim of this paper is to introduce the study of play to IR. It does this by demonstrating that play is 
political, and that it is at work across the global arena. Drawing on the deconstructive tradition 
associated with Jacques Derrida, its core contribution is a theorisation of play. The central argument 
developed is that play is (auto)deconstructive. By this I mean (1) that play precipitates an unravelling 
of any attempt at its conceptualisation, and (2) that this illustrates the value of a deconstructive 
approach to international theory. This claim is substantiated through an analysis of four key binary 
oppositions derived from Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens. Having shown how play powerfully 
deconstructs its own conceptual foundations, I argue that a playful approach offers a robust 
challenge to entrenched assumptions in international theory. 
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Introduction 
As part of the broader turn to the study of popular culture, aesthetics, and affect, International 
Relations (IR) is finally taking the study of games and gaming seriously. Perhaps surprisingly, 
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however, no corresponding theorisation of play has been developed in the discipline. While play 
features in a number of key areas in the field – for example in game theory, videogames and 
wargames, and pedagogical role-plays and simulations – little work has been done to explore its 
potentials for global politics or theory. This paper argues that play is political, and that it is at work 
across the global arena. Focusing on its place in international theory as a starting point for future 
research, I provide a theorisation of play which draws upon the deconstructive tradition associated 
with Jacques Derrida. The paper’s core claim is that play is (auto)deconstructive. By this I mean (1) 
that play precipitates an unravelling of any attempt at its conceptualisation, and (2) that this 
helpfully illustrates the value of a deconstructive approach to international theory. This claim is 
substantiated through analysis of four key binary oppositions derived from Johan Huizinga’s seminal 
text Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. Having shown how play powerfully and 
fruitfully deconstructs its own conceptual foundations, I conclude that a playful approach has the 
potential to do this in the context of international theory. 
The paper proceeds in three stages. Initially, it reviews the conceptual literature, noting a 
transdisciplinary gap on the question of the politics of play. It then identifies three key areas in 
which play is at work in global politics/IR: play as everyday practice; play as resistance; and play as 
subjectification. From there it develops a theorisation of play utilising Jacques Derrida’s thought. The 
aim of this theorisation is to demonstrate that play is (auto)deconstructive by interrogating four key 
binary oppositions derived from Huizinga’s Homo Ludens.1 I have chosen this as the basis upon 
which to develop my argument because it is widely held to be the foundational text for the 
academic study of play,2 and because this centrality has informed much of the study of play across 
the social sciences and humanities through the 20th and 21st centuries. According to Huizinga, in 
order to count as play, an activity must: be distinct from real life, be free/voluntary, not be serious, 
not be work, generate no material profits, be an end in itself, and not be based on reason.3 I use 
these criteria to formulate four binaries through which play is conceptualised in the foundational 
literature: reality/irreality; seriousness/frivolity; productive/pointless; and reason/unreason. 
Deconstructing each in turn, I argue that while play is ordinarily assumed to fit into the devalued end 
                                                 
1 Other scholars have discussed binary relations of this kind, including Stuart L. Brown and Christopher C. 
Vaughan, Play: how it shapes the brain, opens the imagination, and invigorates the soul (New York: Avery, 
2010); Roger Caillois and Meyer Barash, Man, play, and games (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001); 
Mechthild Nagel, Masking the abject: a genealogy of play (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2002); Emily Ryall, 
Wendy Russell, and Malcolm Maclean (eds), The philosophy of play (London: Routledge, 2014).  
2 Caillois and Barash, Man, Play, and Games; Ryall, Russell, and Maclean, The Philosophy of Play, p. 3; Nagel, 
Masking the Abject, p. 2; footnote 6; James S. Hans, The play of the world (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1981), pp. 1-6; Mihai Spariosu, Dionysus reborn: play and the aesthetic dimension in 
modern philosophical and scientific discourse (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 2; footnote 2. 
3 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Kettering, OH: Angelico Press, 2016). 
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of these binaries (the second term in each case), when examined more closely it serves to disrupt 
them in important ways. The consequence of this is that while play’s paradoxical non/conformity 
frustrates stable conceptualisation in binary terms, this very dis/obedience allows us to glimpse 
play’s place in, and exciting potentials for, international theory.  
 
The state of play in IR 
Beyond its metaphorical deployment in explorations of the roles ‘played’ by specific actors, 
institutions, and forces in world politics, examinations of play in IR are frequently limited to the 
sphere of games and gaming. Commercial videogames are currently the most widely researched 
genre in the discipline; a small but growing community of scholars has explored the politics, 
militarism, exceptionalism, and violence of contemporary videogame content and culture, as well as 
the affirmatory and emancipatory potentials of this medium.4 In parallel, the use of games and 
simulations as pedagogical tools in IR has been the focus of important articles.5 The military 
applications of gaming have been explored to a lesser extent in the discipline, with the exception of 
the work of James der Derian6 and Antoine Bousquet.7 Beyond but pertinent to IR, important studies 
                                                 
4 Helen Berents and Brendan Keogh, ‘Virtuous, virtual, but not visceral: (dis)embodied viewing in military-
themed videogames’, Critical Studies on Security, 6:3 (2018), pp. 366–9; Michelle Lee Brown, ‘(Re)Coding the 
Comic Holotrope of Survivance’, Transmotion 3:1 (2017), p. 23; Felix Ciută, ‘Call of Duty: Playing Video Games 
with IR’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 44:2 (2016), pp. 197–215; Craig Hayden, ‘The Procedural 
Rhetorics of Mass Effect : Video Games as Argumentation in International Relations’, International Studies 
Perspectives, (2016); Nick Robinson, ‘Videogames, Persuasion and the War on Terror: Escaping or Embedding 
the Military—Entertainment Complex?’, Political Studies, 60:3 (2012), pp. 504–22; Nick Robinson, ‘Have You 
Won the War on Terror? Military Videogames and the State of American Exceptionalism’, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies, 43:2 (2015), pp. 450–70; Nick Robinson, ‘Militarism and opposition in the living room: 
the case of military videogames’, Critical Studies on Security, 4:3 (2016), pp. 255–75; Mark B. Salter, ‘The 
Geographical Imaginations of Video Games: Diplomacy , Civilization , America’s Army and Grand Theft Auto IV’, 
Geopolitics, 16:2 (2011), pp. 359–88. 
5 Victor Asal, ‘Playing Games with International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives, 6:3 (2005), pp. 
359–73; Victor Asal and Jayson Kratoville, ‘Constructing International Relations Simulations: Examining the 
Pedagogy of IR Simulations Through a Constructivist Learning Theory Lens’, Journal of Political Science 
Education, 9:2 (2013), pp. 132–43; Laura Horn, Olivier Rubin, and Laust Schouenborg, ‘Undead Pedagogy: How 
a Zombie Simulation Can Contribute to Teaching International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives, 
(2015); Nicolas de Zamaróczy, ‘Are We What We Play? Global Politics in Historical Strategy Computer Games’, 
International Studies Perspectives, (2016). Michael Lee and Zachary C. Shirkey, ‘Going Beyond the Existing 
Consensus: The Use of Games in International Relations Education’, Political Science & Politics, 50:02 (2017), 
pp. 571–5; Amandine Orsini, ‘short games series as new pedagogical tools: the international relations games 
show’, European Political Science, 17:3 (2018), pp. 494–518. 
6 James Der Derian, ‘The Desert of the Real and the Simulacrum of War’, International Affairs (Royal Institute 
of International Affairs 1944-) 84, no. 5 (2008): 931–48; James Der Derian, ‘War as Game’, The Brown Journal 
of World Affairs 10, no. 1 (2003): 37–48; James Der Derian, ‘The Simulation Syndrome: From War Games to 
Game Wars’, Social Text, no. 24 (1990): 187-192. 
7 Antoine Bousquet, ‘Wargames’. In Robin Mackay, Simulation, Exercise, Operations (Falmouth, U.K.: 
Urbanomic, 2015). 
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have engaged with racialised and colonial dimensions of gaming in the field of Games Studies8 and 
Media and Communication.9 And engagements from a range of disciplines have provided insightful 
philosophical explorations of games and gaming.10  
Despite this interest, however, no corresponding theorisation of play has been developed in 
the discipline. Calls to take play seriously have issued from scholars such as Maria Mälksoo, who 
argues for ‘the return of play in the scholarship and practice of IR.’11 Mark Salter has also raised the 
question of play, claiming that when  
IR theorists invoke the ‘‘rules of the game’’ or game theory as a frame for systematically 
separating agents from structures, and the conditions of possibility for politics, they are 
limiting the bounds of play—ascribing a set of primarily social conventions (rules) to an 
abstract structure of world politics (the game). Play and these ludological tropes are as vital 
to our political imagination as a self-styled ‘‘serious’’ reading of politics.12 
In addition, play appears in IR debates as a metaphor for the movements of poststructural language 
games and deconstruction, as noted by Michael Dillon,13 Nick Vaughan-Williams,14 and Mark 
Hoffman.15 Play thus features both concretely and  allegorically in several ways in the discipline, but 
there remains a need for a focused exploration distinct from the study of gaming at both conceptual 
and practical levels. The core aim of this paper is to situate play in international theory, understood 
as the field of study concerned with transposing and building upon the tools of political theory in the 
global arena. 
A lack of sustained scholarly attention to play is not unique to IR. As a consequence of its 
supposed frivolity, significant resistance to the academic study of play persists across the human and 
social sciences.16 This is because play is conventionally framed as the opposite of seriousness, and 
                                                 
8 Sybille Lammes and Stephanie de Smale, ‘Hybridity, Reflexivity and Mapping: A Collaborative Ethnography of 
Postcolonial Gameplay’, Open Library of Humanities, 4:1 (2018); Souvik Mukherjee, Videogames and Post-
colonialism: empire plays back (Cham: Palgrave Macmillian, 2017). 
9 Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig De Peuter, Games of empire: global capitalism and video games (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
10 Alexander R. Galloway, Gaming: essays on algorithmic culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006); McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
11 Maria Mälksoo, ‘The Challenge of Liminality for International Relations Theory’, Review of International 
Studies 38, no. 02 (April 2012), p. 492. 
12 In Xavier Guillaume (ed.), ‘The International as an Everyday Practice’, International Political Sociology, 5, no. 
4 (December 2011), p. 453. 
13 Michael Dillon, ‘Intelligence Incarnate: Martial Corporeality in the Digital Age’, Body & Society 9, no.4, 2003, 
p. 25. 
14 Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘International Relations and the `Problem of History’’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 34, no. 1 (August 2005): 115–36. 
15 Mark Hoffman, ‘Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical 
International Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20, no. 2, 1991: 169-185.  
16 Brian Sutton-Smith, The ambiguity of play (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001). 
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commonly associated with the recreational activities of children17 or the irrational behaviours of 
animals.18 When considered as an adult activity, play is frequently treated as the opposite of work,19 
science,20 and reason.21 As James S. Hans notes, when we consider adult play we ‘tend to connect 
the word to leisure-time activities and to the less significant aspects of our lives.’22 As Lori Ducharme 
and Gary Alan Fine similarly argue, ‘play is generally regarded as a time-out behaviour,… set off from 
serious, everyday activity.’23 This has led to play being ‘relegated to a minor and peripheral role’24 
and a general ‘malediction of play’25 in Western culture and scholarship.  
Despite this transdisciplinary marginalisation, pockets of scholars in fields as diverse as 
Classics, English, Geography, Philosophy, Psychology, History, Social/Political Theory, and Folklore 
have collectively generated a vibrant literature exploring play, and founded several professional 
organisations dedicated to its study.26 These scholars argue, in the words of Jacques Ehrmann, that 
the ‘time has come to treat play seriously.’27 Indeed, play’s importance for social and political life is 
difficult, they claim, to overstate: ‘far from being a peripheral activity, play is the most essential 
category of human experience, the activity we constantly turn to without knowing it.’28 Challenging 
claims that it is merely the preserve of children, Tara Woodyer argues that play ‘is fundamental to 
human experience across the life course.’29 As such, it ‘is an essential element of man’s ideological 
makeup, a basic existential phenomenon.’30 Read in this way, play is vital, in both senses of the 
word. According to Eugene Fink, ‘the mode of play is that of spontaneous act, of vital impulse. Play 
is, at it were, existence centred in itself.’31 Brian Massumi appears to concur, stating that the ‘ludic 
                                                 
17 Tara Woodyer, ‘Ludic Geographies: Not Merely Child’s Play’, Geography Compass 6, no. 6 (June 2012): 313–
26. 
18 Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us about Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). 
19 Michael Oriard, Sporting with the Gods: The Rhetoric of Play and Game in American Culture (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 356. 
20 Hans, The Play of the World, p. 3. 
21 Hackett, in Ryall, Russell, and Maclean, The Philosophy of Play, p. 125. 
22 Hans, The Play of the World, p. xi. 
23 In Ronald Bogue and Mihai Spariosu, eds., The Play of the Self (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), p. 99. 
24 Hans, The Play of the World, p. xi. 
25 Nagel, Masking the Abject. 
26 These include the Association for the Study of Play (TASP), the International Council for Children’s Play 
(ICCP), the Association for the Child’s Right to Play, the Association for Play Therapy, and the National Institute 
on Play. 
27 Jacques Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 5. 
28 Hans, The Play of the World, p. xiii. 
29 Woodyer, ‘Ludic Geographies’, p. 322. 
30 Fink, in Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature, p. 19. 
31 Fink, in Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature, p. 20. 
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gesture is a vital gesture’.32 So powerful is its vital quality, according to Stuart Brown (founder of the 
National Institute on Play), that  
play can save your life… Life without play is a grinding, mechanical existence organized 
around doing things necessary for survival. Play is the stick that stirs the drink. It is the basis 
of all art, games, books, sports, movies, fashion, fun, and wonder – in short, the basis of 
what we think of as civilization. Play is the vital essence of life. It is what makes life lifey.33 
As such, according to Hans, ‘play is the most meaningful of human activities, the one that continually 
produces the world in which man lives.’ 34 As this suggests, an absence of play has potentially serious 
consequences for political and social life. As Brown argues, when ‘we stop playing, we stop 
developing, and when that happens, the laws of entropy take over – things fall apart. When we stop 
playing, we start dying.’ 35 
A key theme which remains under-researched in this literature, and which is especially 
pertinent to IR, is the question of the politics of play. Some note has been made of this issue; Brian 
Sutton-Smith, for instance, claims that play’s supposed frivolity might usefully be read as reflection 
of what is deemed ‘politically suitable for some dominating groups’36, while Mechthild Nagel draws 
attention to the ‘ideological agendas’ at work in philosophical delimitations of ‘what gets excluded 
and who is not allowed to play.’37 Salter also raises this point in his statement that we ‘must 
understand the signification of international relations to be a play of meanings between the 
structure and the sign, but also the meaning of play as a way of instantiating the international 
structure and the sign of sovereignty.’38 Addressing this transdisciplinary gap, this paper argues that 
play is political, and that it is at work across the global landscape. To substantiate these claims, the 
remainder of this section explores three interrelated areas in which play features centrally in global 
politics/IR: play as everyday practice; play as resistance; and play as subjectification.  
 
Play as everyday practice 
Over the last decade, IR has become increasingly concerned with the everyday as a site of political 
praxis. Scholars associated with this ‘practice turn’ have argued that because everyday activities are 
                                                 
32 Massumi, What Animals Teach Us about Politics, p. 8. 
33 Cited by Feezell in Ryall, Russell, and Maclean, The Philosophy of Play, p. 14. 
34 Hans, The Play of the World, p. vi. 
35 Brown and Vaughan, Play, p. 73. 
36 Sutton-Smith, The Ambiguity of Play, p. 207. 
37 Nagel, Masking the Abject, p. 1. 
38 Salter in Guillaume (ed.), ‘The International as an Everyday Practice’, p. 455. 
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‘the stuff that drives the world and makes it “hang together,” the everyday practices of diplomats, 
terrorists, environmentalists, or financial analysts become the object of investigation.’39 These 
everyday practices are important for IR because they offer new insights into the construction and 
circulation of knowledge: ‘they situate knowledge in practice and thereby develop a unified account 
of knowing and doing… Connecting “practice,” “acting,” and “knowing” implies understanding 
knowledge as “knowing from within”.’40 Furthermore, they create space for a focus on agency which 
resists IR’s tendency to privilege state and institutional actors. As a ubiquitous practice which rests 
upon complex individual and collective relationships, play provides fertile ground upon which to 
explore everyday global politics. Play occurs across state borders and cleavages of class, gender, age, 
ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. While play forms are, of course, often specific to time, place, and 
culture, play as such is truly global. Indeed, as will be explored below, play is seen by many as 
productive of social and political life, and as key to many forms of situated knowledge. Indeed, as 
Sicart notes, some argue that play is itself a ‘way of knowledge.’41  
Everyday play occurs across the global arena. On both individual and collective bases, play is 
a key element of a host of activities and practices related to fun, relaxation, and escape from the 
compulsions of labour and order.42 In its recreational forms, play features in activities as diverse as 
video- and analogue games; carnivals, festivals and dance; sports and contests; and make-believe 
and story-telling. As such, play forms a key part of how ordinary people the world over spend their 
non-working time. Play is also used for more ‘serious’ purposes across the global political landscape, 
including child and adult education, and medical and therapeutic treatments. Outside the civilian 
domain, play is in evidence in military institutions, for instance in simulations used in training 
regimes and for passing ‘down-time’ on deployment. In addition, veterans’ organisations and 
rehabilitation centres use play to build communities and promote suicide prevention among ex-
service members.  
Play is thus used on an everyday basis provide relief from the pressures of both civilian and 
military life. This is because, as Brown notes, ‘[play is] fun. It makes you feel good. It provides 
psychological arousal… It is a cure for boredom.’ In play, he continues, we ‘stop worrying about 
whether we look good or awkward, smart or stupid. We stop thinking about the fact that we are 
thinking.’43 As such, these examples of everyday play provide interesting insights into the exercise of 
                                                 
39 Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, ‘The Play of International Practice’, International Studies Quarterly, 
59:3 (2015), pp. 449. 
40 Bueger and Gadinger, ‘The Play of International Practice’, p. 453. 
41 Miguel Sicart, Play Matters (Cambridge, Massachusetts London: MIT Press, 2014), p. 86. 
42 Sutton-Smith, The ambiguity of play, p. 11. 
43 Brown and Vaughan, Play, p. 17. 
8 
 
agency.  On the one hand, play and playfulness serve to punctuate the apparent rigidity of wage 
labour and military service, creating space for experiences less overdetermined by prevailing power 
relations. As Sicart explains, [t]o be playful is to appropriate a context that is not created or intended 
for play… Appropriation implies a shift in the way a particular technology or situation is interpreted. 
The most usual transformation is from functional or goal oriented to pleasurable or emotionally 
engaging.’44 In this reading, as an everyday site of global politics, play occurs in time and space 
different from those governed by wage labour and bureaucratic orders, illuminating through 
agential practice activities and logics beyond those governing people’s working lives. On the other 
hand, to the extent that players stop thinking about thinking when at play, agency is potentially 
compromised. As a site of everyday politics, then, an analysis of play generates interesting lines of 
inquiry relating to questions of agency and praxis.   
 
Play as resistance 
As this suggests, a second key element of play for IR is its role in sites and practices of political 
contestation and resistance. Play is an important element of many types of social movements and 
activist interventions, taking such forms as visual artworks, performances, occupations, publications, 
dress-up, and spectacle. In the Western world, this is perhaps best illustrated by the Situationist 
movement of the mid-20th century45 and its more recent inheritors.46 In a process Richard Barbrook 
calls ‘ludic subversion’, participants of the Situationist International of the late 1950s used play to 
generate and convey radical political ideas through such media as industrial painting, altering 
existing pictures, experimental films, seditious graffiti, self-published journals, and collaged books.47 
The centrality of play to the Situationists movement was due, he continues, to their belief that it is 
‘the radical antithesis of alienated labour.’48 As Sadie Plant explains, ‘for the Situationists, glimpses 
of authentic experience are present in moments of artistic expression, political struggle, and self-
                                                 
44 Sicart, Play Matters, p. 27. 
45 Richard Barbrook, Class Wargames: ludic subversion against spectacular capitalism (Wivenhoe; New York; 
Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2014); Sadie Plant, ‘The Situationist International: A Case of Spectacular 
Neglect’, Radical Philosophy, 55: Summer (1990), pp. 3–10; Owen Worth and Carmen Kuhling, “Counter-
hegemony, anti-globalisation and culture in International Political Economy”, Capital and Class, 84 (2004), pp. 
31–42. 
46 For an exploration of contemporary Situationist-inspired anti-militarist activity see Chris Rossdale, Resisting 
Militarism: direct action and the politics of subversion. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). 
47 Barbrook, Class Wargames, p. 56. 
48 Barbrook, Class Wargames, p. 63. 
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absorbed play; alienation is the experience of removal and absence, the supersession of which is 
experienced in the practice of the conscious creation of situations.’49  
For groups seeking to resist global phenomena like the arms trade, climate change, or the 
rise of the far right today, play and playfulness can be important tools. In his study of British anti-
militarist movements, Chris Rossdale explores the playful elements of the Space Hijackers, a group 
of contemporary situationists, noting that their interventions can be read as ‘an invitation to play a 
game, to subvert easy narratives of security and insecurity and revel in the (tragic) comedy, in 
absurdity.’ Their activities, he continues, show ‘how playfulness can operate as a subversive practice 
that reveals and exploits the instabilities of apparently stable concepts without imposing new ones.’ 
Such play ‘demonstrates the violence of the state’s (dis)order and (in)security while affirming a 
creative politics of dis/order and in/security.’50 Play can thus resist elements of prevailing material 
and organisational orders in ways that relate directly to IR’s interest in political contestation and 
resistance.  
In addition to such concrete resistances – indeed, underpinning them – play can unsettle 
conceptual and ideological norms. For example, as Adorno notes, logics of substitutability and 
exchange are disrupted in children’s play because they are ‘still aware, in their spontaneous 
perception, of the contradiction between phenomenon and fungibility that the resigned adult no 
longer sees, and they shun it.’ He continues: 
Play is their defence. The unerring child is struck by the peculiarity of the equivalent forms… 
In his purposeless activity the child, by a subterfuge, sides with use-value against exchange 
value. Just because he deprives the things with which he plays of their mediated usefulness, 
he seeks to rescue in them what is benign toward men…51  
At the interrelated levels of conceptual and material resistance, then, play can serve as a disruptive 
force in global politics. In Sicart’s analysis, reflecting this claim, play can be read ‘as a struggle against 
efficiency, seriousness, and technical determinism.’52 Because of its processual quality, play can 
serve to disrupt entrenched assumptions and apparent givens. This is politically salient because, as 
Emmanual Lévinas argued, ‘political totalitarianism rests on ontological totalitarianism.’53 When read 
in this manner, play has the capacity to be a(nta)gonistic to forces of order, rationalism, and 
bureaucracy.  
                                                 
49 Plant, 'The Situationist International', p. 9. 
50 Rossdale, Resisting Militarism, pp. 125-6. 
51 Theodor W. Adorno and E. F. N. Jephcott, Minima moralia: reflections on a damaged life (London; New York: 
Verso, 2005), p. 228. 
52 Sicart, Play Matters, p. 5. 
53 Emmanuel Levínas, Difficult freedom: essays on Judaism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 
p. 206. 
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Play as subjectification 
Finally, play is at work in IR in explorations of identity and subject-production which have formed a 
key part of feminist, poststructural, postcolonial, queer, and other critical interventions in the field. 
In addition to its resistant capacities, play is also generative. As, Sicart notes, we should read play 
‘not as an activity of consumption but as an activity of production.’54 Through these productive 
characteristics, play can be read as at work in individual and collective identity, understood in 
processual terms. Key to any analysis of play is the question of who plays. Some have argued that 
play is a universal activity among humans. Resonating with post-human IR scholarship55, others go 
further, noting that play occurs in many animal species.56 Perhaps more interesting than 
speculations about universality is the question of the self in play, or put differently, who one is when 
one plays and how one is produced through play. Play is aligned with, and provides a useful 
vocabulary for, theoretical traditions in IR which seek to explore modes of becoming which 
problematise and resist concrete Being. This is because play invites an exploration of the disrupted 
and processual character of subjectivity. As Fink notes, in play we find a particular kind of 
schizophrenia, a split personality, because the player is divided into the self who plays and the self 
created through play.57 
Sutton-Smith argues that play is ambiguous. I would amend this slightly to suggest that play 
ambiguates; because play is charaterised by movement and process, as opposed to existing in a 
static form, and because this movement has productive effects on the actors and objects it touches, 
play takes the ordinary and the given and changes them into something qualitatively different. This 
disruptive capacity, I suggest, runs as deep as the production of individual and collective identities. 
In this reading, play, for better or worse, has a hand in the becoming of subjects, but can also be 
used to punctuate and disrupt existing subject norms through its processual movements. 
Accordingly, coming to grips with play is a fruitful means by which the widespread Cartesian 
anxieties at work in rationalist approaches may be brought to light and worked through. As Hans 
notes, there is only one logical explanation for the enduring fear of play in rationalist philosophy: 
‘fear for the “self,” for that “identity” which supposedly defines us. Seen as identity, in play we 
always place the whole of identity into question, and that seems too great a risk to take.’58  
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 None of this is to suggest that play is always politically progressive or emancipatory. As the 
Situationists observed of the Surrealists, radical playful interventions can be quickly recuperated by 
hegemonic forces.59 Indeed in some cases the distinction between work and play has been eroded 
significantly; as McKenzie Wark notes, for some ‘[w]ork becomes play… You have to be a team 
player. Your work has to be creative, inventive, playful – ludic… Play becomes everything to which it 
was once opposed. It is work, it is serious; it is morality, it is necessity.’60 Sutton-Smith further 
cautions that play as a form of power relations is called by many names, including ‘warfare, 
hegemony, conflict, competition, glory, manliness, contest, and resistance.’61 This suggests a further 
possible line of scholarly enquiry: the cooptation of play by forms of global order. The rise of 
militarised videogames would be a case in point here.  
And yet, there are good reasons for looking to play for signs of, and possibilities for, 
resistance to hegemonic forces of order and Being in global politics. While it cannot not guard 
against the play of domination, as Mukherjee notes, play offers scope for subversion: 
[P]lay is a crucial factor in disrupting the centres of the structured colonial notions of 
progress… Playing at colonialism can also turn into the subversion of colonialism… The 
multiple possibility-spaces of play are the site of both the Great Game of empire and its 
opposite, play as the disruption of the colonial chronicle of progress. 
Part of the reason for play’s resistant possibilities as that its processual character tends away from 
domination towards the productive.62 This fluidity, Ryall et al note, contains an openness with 
‘liberatory potential’.63 To this extent, play as a site of ethical possibility is a key area of interest for 
IR. Having established that play is political and that it permeates the global arena, this paper now 
turns to establishing its importance for international theory. Because of its disruptive processual 
character, I argue that play is (auto)deconstructive, and this that has salutary consequences for 
international theory.  
 
Play in(g) international theory 
The importance of play for social and political life has attracted the attention of a diverse range of 
theorists working across the humanities and social sciences. While this literature varies greatly in 
scope and focus, one point of agreement is that the standard scholarly tools furnished by reason, 
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science, and philosophy are not well-suited to the study of play. In Fink’s words, play ‘is a 
phenomenon for which there are no adequate criteria at hand.’64 Concurring with this sentiment, 
Sutton-Smith describes play as fundamentally ambiguous65, while for Spariosu it is amphibolous.66 
This ambiguity is reflected in play being variously analysed as behaviour or activity; motive, attitude, 
or state of mind; form or structure; meaningful experience; and ontologically distinct 
phenomenon67, and in the frequent use of metaphor and allusion in scholarly analyses. Sutton-Smith 
notes that children’s play is used ‘as a metaphor for the ephemerality of life’68, while Hans describes 
play as a ‘back-and-forth movement’ through ‘a familiar structure that allows one to play with the 
unfamiliar’.69 Susanna Millar suggests that play might be best understood as an adverb; ‘not as a 
name for a class of activities, nor as distinguished by the accompanying mood, but to describe how 
and under what circumstances an action is performed.’70 In a similar vein, Massumi suggests that 
play’s defining feature is its ‘esqueness’, understood as the ‘performative signature of the mode of 
abstraction at play.’71 Other accounts posit that play might be best understood through what it is 
not.72 In this vein, Huizinga claims that ‘the opposite of play is earnest, also used in the more special 
sense of work,73 while Nagel argues that ‘play finds itself cast in opposition to seriousness,’74 and 
Sutton-Smith concludes that the opposite of play ‘is vacillation, or worse, it is depression.’75 
Reflecting this conceptual diversity, scholarly theorisations of play employ a variety of 
approaches, including ‘metaphysical, epistemological, ontological, and ethical’ perspectives.76 This is 
due to what Spariosu calls play’s ‘ambivalent ontological status’. He explains that by this he means 
that play is ‘both phenomenon and subjectivity or both behaviour and intentionality.’77 Nagel 
similarly identifies play’s ‘precarious ontological status’, and notes the difficulties faced by those 
attempting to theorise play insofar as it ‘is an elusive term which defies all conceptualization.’78 If an 
epistemological approach is taken, the study of play is no less challenging because play is ‘a mixture 
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of reality and irreality, of truth and illusion.’79 Taking a phenomenological approach which reflects 
this paradoxical epistemological status, Fink notes that the ‘play world contains both subjective 
imaginary elements and objective ontic elements.’80 Others, like Hans, have argued that a dialectical 
approach is more incisive because the ‘relationship between the ontological and the epistemological 
is at the heart of our considerations of play.’ This dialectic, he continues, ‘leads to no aufhebung… 
[because] play within the ontological framework – and the epistemological one insofar as it is part of 
the ontological play – is capable of effecting changes within that network.’81 In contrast to this, for 
many scholars associated with the phenomenological and poststructural traditions play defies 
philosophical and scholarly analyses because of its ‘atopian’ quality. As Spariosu indicates, for such 
scholars play ‘cannot be approached with critical or analytical tools, implying both a mode of being 
that remains inaccessible to either rational thought or intuition.’82 
 Despite, or in response to, this immanent ambiguity, some useful conceptual analyses have 
been produced. These analyses variously take a broad or narrow perspective; some scholars ‘see 
pure play as a very narrow and relatively rare phenomenon, while others have identified it “under 
nearly every rock in the social landscape.”’83 A particularly useful framing is provided by Sutton-
Smith via his seven ‘rhetorics of play’ - progress, fate, power, identity, the imaginary, the self, and 
frivolity84 - upon which many scholars draw. Woodyer, for instance, develops this taxonomy by 
distinguishing  between ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-instrumental’ framings of play. Reflecting Sutton-
Smith’s ‘rhetoric of progress’, the former argues that play ‘is a process of social and cultural learning, 
and emotional, cognitive, and physical development. Conjuring the ‘rhetoric of frivolity’, the latter 
positions play ‘in opposition to seriousness, morality and productive work, and the social relations 
these value structures reproduce’. Interestingly, Woodyer notes, these rhetorics are not treated as 
mutually exclusive but, paradoxically, espoused together.85 Play is thus simultaneously viewed as 
efficacious and purposeless. In contrast, in psychosocial framings, as Oriard explains, play can be a 
night-dream, understood as a journey back in time to repressed experiences and their associations, 
a day-dream, exploring what is not yet, or a nightmare, experienced as culture’s ‘fears about 
unregenerate human nature, personal irresponsibility, and social chaos.’86 Two particularly helpful 
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but nevertheless provisional definitions of play are (1) an ‘enactive pragmatics of lived abstraction’87, 
and (2) the ‘temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of resources primarily committed to 
instrumental  purposes.’88  
 Having provided a brief overview of some of the core contributions of, and ambiguities in, 
the transdisciplinary theoretical literature, this paper now deconstructs four key binaries which 
underpin it. As the below will show, in each case play is conventionally placed at the devalued end of 
the binary, but its movements playfully resist and subvert these conceptual hierarchies. As such I 
show that play is (auto)deconstructive, in the sense that exposes the politics and power relations at 
work at its core by deconstructing itself and thereby demonstrates the utility of deconstructive 
analyses in international theory. 
 
The play of deconstruction 
The deconstructive tradition has played a significant part in the development of postpositivist 
international theory. Scholars exploring a wide range of empirical and theoretical subject matter 
have explicitly used a Derridean approach,89 while others have drawn from his oeuvre in 
explorations of broader theoretical debates.90 Still others use his thought in texts aimed at 
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students,91 and there has be no shortage of critique of deconstruction and associated approaches.92 
Derrida argues that Western thought relies on a series of oppositional binaries, which operate on a 
hierarchical basis. He explains: ‘in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the 
peaceful coexistence of a vis-á-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms govern 
the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.’93 Accordingly, it is the task of 
deconstruction to expose and challenge these power relations. Such a challenge proceeds in two 
steps: first, it must ‘overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of overturning 
is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition’. In this first move, then, the 
devalued end of the binary is placed at the valued end, and vice versa. The second step, Derrida 
continues, subverts the binary more fully by generating new concepts which challenge those at work 
in it: ‘we must also mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the 
interruptive emergence of a new “concept”, a concept that can no longer be, and could never be, 
included in the previous regime.’ His strategy of deconstruction is intended, then, ‘to avoid both 
simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the closed field 
of these oppositions, thereby confirming it.’94  
The relevance of Derrida’s thought to theorising play has been noted by several key 
commentators. Sutton-Smith, for example, notes that through the play of signifiers, ‘Derrida’s 
proposal of deconstruction was one tactic for endlessly finding further interpretations not yet 
revealed and thus defeating orthodox understandings… [His books] treat their subject with 
considerable if abstruse playfulness.’ Children’s play, he continues, ‘is a deconstruction of the world 
in which they live. If the world is a text, the play is the reader’s response to that text.95 Spariosu 
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similarly argues that Derrida’s notion of différance should be read as ‘a play of differences and 
oppositions which generates and distributes meaning while itself remaining meaningless… Thus 
différance [is] a pure play of simulacra.’ Indeed play, he continues, ‘permeates Derrida’s entire 
discourse.’96 In this vein, John Caputo insightfully notes that  
it is a question of keeping the play in play, of playing along with the play, of avoiding at all 
costs the repression of the play … [M]etaphysics is the systematic attempt to repress the 
play, to hold it in check: to create the illusion of abiding truth over and against the flux; to 
posit metaphysical grounds which cannot be shaken; to establish stable and transparent 
signs which lead us straight to pure presence.97 
As this suggests, key to the radical reflexivity of deconstruction is its ceaselessness. 
Deconstruction can allow us to glimpse the dynamic, if paradoxical, play of constitutive 
concepts and thereby problematise the hegemonic discourses and forces on which they rely. Against 
claims that it is apolitical or removed from the material concerns of global politics, I submit that a 
deconstructive approach is impactful politically as well as conceptually. As I have argued elsewhere, 
without overdetermining or annexing them, deconstruction can be compatible with, and 
complementary to, critical approaches concerned with challenging the symbolic and concrete 
inequalities of patriarchy, colonialism, heteronormativity, and beyond. Much as when an issue or 
concept is discussed in a classroom without ultimate resolution, or a text read which challenges 
one’s views without offering an immediate ready solution, the consequence of a deconstructive 
engagement is not stasis and silence, but rather a sparking of fresh reflections, a rethinking and 
reimagining which makes possible further generative and productive acts, and a resistance to 
hegemonic power relations. Operationalised in this way, far from ineffectual, deconstruction is ‘the 
act of taking a position, in the very work it does with regard to the political-institutional structures 
that constitute and govern our practices, our competences, and our performances.’98 The remainder 
of this paper develops a theorisation of play which demonstrates that it precipitates an unravelling 
of any attempt at its conceptualisation, and argues that this illustrates the value of a deconstructive 
approach to international theory. 
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Reality/irreality 
A first assumption about play is that it is different from real life and reality as normally understood. 
According to Huizinga, ‘play is not “ordinary” or “real” life. It is rather a stepping out of “real” life 
into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own.’99 This claim is echoed by Caillois, 
who argues that ‘play is essentially a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of life.’100 
This separateness from real life is framed in both temporal and spatial terms. In Huizinga’s words, 
play ‘proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space,’101 while for Fink ‘the play world 
has no locus or duration at all in the reality-complex of space and time.’102  
As regards the spatial dimension, Huizinga claims that ‘one of the most important 
characteristics of play [is] its spatial separation from real life. A closed space is marked out for it, 
either materially or ideally, hedged off from the everyday surroundings.’103 In Massumi’s analysis, a 
designated space is vital for play because territory is among play’s necessary conditions. And yet, 
according to Massumi, such territory is changed by play; it is made different to its real-world 
equivalent through a process of ‘enactive cartography’ which ‘creates the territory it maps, in new 
emergent variations.’ Play thus occurs in real space made unreal. It ‘is an operation of lived 
abstraction in which territorial functions are at the same time actively invoked and paradoxically 
placed in suspense, to novel effect.’104  
In parallel, play occurs in alternate, unreal time. As Brown notes, ‘play provides freedom 
from time. When we are fully engaged in play, we lose a sense of the passage of time.’105 Such a 
sentiment is evident in many other analyses of play. Feezell, for instance, notes that ‘[p]lay time 
starts and stops, speeds up and slows down, extends limitlessly, or is extinguished’, running in ways 
that are fundamentally different to ‘ordinary clock time.’106 Importantly, this alternate temporality 
has gratifying effects for those playing. This is because it exists outside of what Fink calls our 
‘futuristic mode of being’, which is focused on life’s ultimate goals and plagued by uncertainties 
about the possibility or nature of happiness. In his words,  
[i]n contrast with the restless dynamism, the obscure ambiguity and relentless futurism of 
our life, play is characterized by calm, timeless “presence” and autonomous self-sufficient 
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meaning – play resembles an oasis of happiness that we happen upon… In the autonomy of 
play action there appears a possibility of human timelessness in time. Time is then 
experienced, not as a precipitate rush of successive moments, but rather as one full moment 
that is, so to speak, a glimpse of eternity.107 
In play’s capacity to ‘still time’s arrow’108, then, the existential anxieties of being-towards-death are 
suspended. 
And yet, these non-real spatial and temporal dimensions of play are not entirely unreal. In 
Huizinga’s estimation, we play in an unreal world ‘without, however, wholly losing consciousness of 
“ordinary reality”.’ 109 Fink argues similarly that the ‘play world does not form a curtain or a wall 
between us and all that is around us. It does not obscure or hide the real world.’110 In these readings, 
play is at once qualitatively different from real, ordinary activities and, as noted above, a regular part 
of everyday lived existence. Woodyer highlights this in her claim that ‘[p]laying’s vital nature also 
affirms its everyday character.’111 This is important because the ‘everyday is a crucial part of the 
construction and reification of an “international,” and play is a crucial part of the everyday.’112 As 
both Woodyer and Massumi note, while not strictly real, play is fundamentally embodied, existing 
materially rather than solely imaginatively.113 
Fink provides a compelling reading of this paradoxical real/unreal and embodied/imaginary 
status. He explains: the ‘play world is an imaginary dimension, whose ontological meaning presents 
an obscure and difficult problem. We play in the so-called real world, but while playing there 
emerges an enigmatic realm that is not nothing, and yet is nothing real.’114 Fink posits that this real 
unreality is based on the unique spacio-temporal relations mentioned above: 
[Play] possesses its own internal space and time. And yet again, while playing we consume 
real time and real space. But the space of play never merges into the continuum of space 
that we inhabit in real life. The same is true of time… The world of play is not suspended in a 
purely ideal world. It always has a real setting, and yet it is never a real thing among other 
real things, although it has an absolute need of real things as a point of departure.115 
Play is thus not simply illusion or chimera. It is not ordinary everyday reality, yet it occurs within 
‘real’ space and time, changing these ‘real’ phenomena through its coming-to-pass within them. As 
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simultaneously real and not real, then, play taunts us with its inaccessibility.116 It exists in a zone of 
indiscernibility117; it is ‘a real mode of behaviour, which contains, so to speak a mirror image derived 
from behaviour in the real world… Play is finite creativity in the magic dimension of illusion… [P]lay is 
the symbolic act of representing the meaning of the world and of life.’118 
As the above suggests, one of the most interesting aspects of play is its capacity to 
simultaneously affirm and deny its realness. As a ‘dramatistic negative’, play can enact an event or 
gesture which is recognisable as, but qualitatively different from, its real-life equivalent.119 It does 
this through performative metacommunication.120 In his ‘A Theory of Play and Mind’ (1972), 
Geoffrey Bateson provides a helpful example, which Massumi discusses at length. When two actors 
– in Bateson’s example, wolf cubs – engage in a play-fight, they perform gestures which are similar 
to, but not the same as, acts of combat. Somehow the participants signal to each other that the acts 
are play rather than combat, which involves ‘the staging of a paradox’. The wolf cub 
‘says’, in the manner in which it bites, ‘this is not a bite’. The play bite, Bateson says, actively 
‘stands for’ another action, at the same time as it puts the context in which that action finds 
its practical force in suspense… The wolf cub says through his teeth: ‘this is not a bite; this is 
not a fight; this is a game; I am hereby placing myself on a different register of existence, 
which nevertheless stands for its suspended analogue.121 
The play-fight thus comments upon what it is doing as it is doing it, saying ‘these actions do not 
denote what they would denote’. Crucially, however, the player has to provide this commentary to 
prevent the play becoming a fight. As Massumi notes, ‘if it were so simple a case as the actions not 
denoting what they would denote, they would not have to deny their denoting.’ Play thus ‘says what 
it denies, and denies what it says.’ The result is an instance of Epimenides paradox, which consists in 
‘a negative statement containing an implicit negative metastatement.’122 
 As this suggests, play resists a simple designation of real or not real, and in so doing 
deconstructs the reality/irreality binary which is often used as a conceptual basis to define it. This 
might appear frustrating, implying that it sits beyond the realm of sensible scholarly examination. 
And yet, there are salutary consequences to play’s disruption of this binary. Developing a critique of 
Huizinga and Caillois, Ehrmann observes an ‘unacknowledged uneasiness’ in their presentation of 
‘”reality”, the “real”, as a given component of the problem, as a referent needing no discussion, as a 
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matter of course, neutral and objective.’123 This unease is a result of their reliance upon a concrete 
reality as a yard-stick against which to evaluate play. Far from resulting in a satisfactory 
categorisation, this reliance betrays a suppression of the question of reality itself. As Erhmann 
argues, 
It is legitimate to wonder by what right “reality” may be said to be first, existing prior to its 
components – play in this case (although it might just as well be some other object in the 
social sciences) – and serving as their standard. How could “reality” serve as a norm and 
thereby guarantee normality even before having been test and evaluated in and through its 
manifestations?... Play is not played against a background of a fixed, stable, reality which 
would serve as its standard. All reality is caught up in the play of the concepts which 
designate it… [T]he distinguishing character of reality is that it is played. Play, reality, culture 
are synonymous and interchangeable.’124 
What is suggested here is that an approach which seeks to evaluate play against an ontologically 
prior standard of reality is fruitless in its own terms. It cannot finally arbitrate on the question of the 
reality or unreality of play. Against its intended outcome, it does, however, shine a light on the onto-
political underpinning of such an attempt to affix play to, or banish play from, a preestablished 
category of ‘reality’. In other words, play playfully exposes the Cartesian anxiety at work in the 
rationalist schema, and demands a critical engagement with the nature and composition of reality 
itself: ‘This reality which is considered innocent and behind whose objectivity some scholars 
sheepishly take shelter, must not be the starting point of any analysis but rather its final 
outcome.’125 Play’s (auto)deconstruction thus functions to put into question the category of reality 
as itself playfully constructed. In so doing, it does not simply repeat the tired overture that reality is 
socially constructed but rather draws attention to the latent power relations at work in specific 
designations of reality and irreality, offering a jumping-off point for critical analysis.  
 
Seriousness/frivolity 
A related but distinct criterion posited, but also challenged, by Huizinga is that play is opposed to 
seriousness. Huizinga argues that play is paradoxically at once not serious and very serious. To take 
the first framing first, Huizinga states: ‘To our way of thinking, play is the direct opposite of 
seriousness… We can say: play is non-serious.’126 As Echeruo notes, this logic is tacitly deployed by 
other theorists of play, for whom ‘“play” is associated with frivolity and paidia; [and] ludus is 
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thought to be necessarily (and by its very nature) unserious.’127 In Nagel’s account, Aristotle initiates 
a ‘malediction’ of play in Western philosophy by privileging seriousness over play: ‘And we say that 
serious things [spoudaia] are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement 
[paidia].’128 In this logic, play is usually defined, as Fink notes, ‘in contrast with serious and 
responsible activities… Play is thought of more or less as frivolous and pleasurable nonsense.’129  
Such a view is challenged, however, by a number of commentators in two important ways. A 
first objection leaves the binary relation of seriousness vs frivolity intact, but argues for the 
importance of the latter as a counterweight to the oppressive character of the former. Exploring a 
hitherto largely overlooked analysis of play in Being and Nothingness, Rebecca Pitt argues that 
Sartre’s account should be read ‘as a critique of, rather than a statement about, our existence. 
Furthermore, play tentatively indicates the parameters for Sartre’s developing emancipatory 
theory.’130 This is because play has the capacity to expose and distance us from the possessive mode 
of being he calls the ‘project-of-trying-to-be-God’, which is characterised by the desire for 
objectivity, being, and totality. Play can do this because it ‘releases subjectivity’, and introduces 
‘“the least possessive attitude”’ one can adopt towards human reality’. Citing Sartre, Pitt concludes: 
‘Play is the counter-example to those who “make the Not a part of their very subjectivity, establish 
their human personality as a perpetual negation”, or, in other words, objectify themselves.’131  
According to this Sartrean reading, then, play ‘is the antithesis of the dominant and 
pervasive way in which we understand our existence through bad faith and seriousness.’132 This 
potent unseriousness allows us to break through the barriers to freedom and self-authorship 
erected by dominant modes of being. As Sutton-Smith shows, players can utilise the very 
unseriousness of play for the most serious of ends. Like the Dionysian trickster, the self-authoring 
player ‘is so frivolous he [sic] can invert frivolity.’ The implication of this is that far from trivial or 
insignificant, ‘frivolity is potentially the most sacred play of all,… [making] players feel that they can 
transcend reality and indeed morality.’133 Framed in this way, play becomes the salutary binary 
opposite to seriousness. The dichotomy in this case is inverted, placing frivolous play at the 
privileged side, in contrast to its conventional devalued position.  
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A second challenge argues that the dichotomous framing of seriousness/frivolity should be 
disrupted because play is a serious matter. Rather than inverting the binary, in this case it is 
subverted. Huizinga acknowledges that the seriousness/frivolity binary is problematic: ‘Examined 
more closely, however, the contrast between play and seriousness proves to be neither conclusive 
nor fixed... Some play can be very serious indeed.’134 He elaborates: 
[The] “only pretending” quality of play betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of play 
compared with “seriousness”, a feeling that seems to be as primary as play itself. 
Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out, the consciousness of play being “only 
pretend” does not by any means prevent it from proceeding with the utmost seriousness… 
The contrast between play and seriousness is always fluid. The inferiority of play is 
constantly being offset by the corresponding superiority of its seriousness.135 
In this reading, then, the frivolity implied by play’s ir/reality is counteracted by the seriousness with 
which it is taken by players.  Somehow, despite its ultimate groundlessness, play is brought into the 
realm of the serious through players’ commitment to, and investment in, it. As Feezell explains, 
playful activities ‘aren’t “serious”, but, of course, they can be wholly absorbing and engaged in quite 
seriously. I have called such an attitude ‘serious nonseriousness’.”136 Such seriousness of player 
engagement troubles the serious/frivolity binary, showing that despite its ambiguous ontological 
and epistemological status, play is a serious business in important ways. As Emily Ryall notes, ‘it is 
not so straightforward to say that one must be involved in a non-serious autotelic activity to be 
playing; for… many instances of play, namely game-playing, are taken very seriously.’137 
This seriousness is due in part to the central role play plays, according to Huizinga, in 
producing civilisation and culture. He takes the view that ‘culture arises in the form of play, that it is 
played from the very beginning.’138 It furthermore derives from a view of play as, in John Wall’s 
words, ‘the expression of humanity’s basic goodness and wisdom, its natural or sacred spontaneity 
and simplicity… [and] human authenticity.’139 In these framings, play’s seriousness derives from its 
productive or generative capacities. For Huizinga and others, play reflects and perpetuates crucial 
socio-political and cultural forces, at once affirming and improving elements of the human condition. 
This seriousness has also to do with players’ affective experiences in play. So serious can play 
become, Massumi notes, that it ‘provokes the same terror’ as its analogue counterpart. It can, he 
explains, be ‘deadly serious’. This is because while the ontological status of play is different to its 
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‘real-world’ equivalent, the two generate the same affective response in players: ‘there is one factor 
that is not touched by the suspension effected by the play-gesture’s placing the ensuing activity in 
the conditional mode. That factor is affect… The scaryesque inspires fright.’140 For these reasons, 
Barry Dixon argues, an ‘important start to any examination of play is how serious a thing it is.’141  
  And yet, while these imperative to take play seriously are well taken, according to 
Ducharme and Fine play requires a form of engagement other than seriousness as a necessary 
condition. Too serious an approach in a play environment, they suggest, can undermine it: 
‘Participants must modulate their level of engrossment so as not to be either over- or under-
involved in the situation… If play is taken too seriously, it ceases to be playful; similarly, if a game is 
not taken seriously enough, it falls apart.’142 To return to Bateson’s example, if one wolf cub bites 
the other too seriously, the metacommunicative act through which the bite connotes nip is lost. The 
result is that the bite become a bite proper, at which point the playful encounter loses its qualitative 
difference from its real-world equivalent. Play must, then, be taken seriously through the disruption 
of the seriousness/frivolity binary, and at the same time not so seriously that it loses its playfulness 
altogether. 
 A related issue arises when we consider the politics at work in the seriousness/ frivolity 
binary. At its core, as Sutton-Smith points out, lies a series of hierarchical power relations. He 
explains: 
play is declared frivolous not only because of neglect or because frivolous play is the 
abstract opposite of some higher-level form of ludic activity. The label “frivolity” is, rather, 
an abuse of some kinds of play on behalf of other kinds of play, because that is what is 
politically suitable for some dominating groups… [It may thus be read] as an implicit form of 
political or scholarly denigration.143 
Here, Sutton-Smith begins a discussion of the ways in which the play of ‘less powerful groups is 
implicitly excluded and even ridiculed.’ The historically dominant forms of play and games of ‘kings, 
princes, politicians, colonizing administrators, aristocracies, ethnic groups, heterosexuals, and men,’ 
he argues, have been inscribed with a seriousness through association with heroism, military 
prowess, competitiveness, and organised festivals and contests. The play of marginalised groups, 
including women, racial and sexual minorities, the poor, and those with less power and wealth, has, 
in parallel, been disparaged. The former groups have, of course, historically excluded the latter from 
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participating in valorised forms of play. And yet this devaluation of marginalised play has only been 
partially successful because it has not, at least not entirely, undermined participants’ seriousness 
about their play. As Sutton-Smith concludes, ‘these denigrated groups are generally deadly serious 
and righteous about their own play as are those who denigrate them. They are not frivolous in their 
own eyes, they are seriously at play.’144 Thus, as Kostas Axelos argues, ‘play should not be set in 
opposition to serious and profitable activities.’145 This is because, as Fink notes, as long as ‘we 
continue naively using popular antitheses of “work-play,” “frivolity-seriousness” and the like, we will 
never grasp the ontological meaning of play.’146 We might add to this that these antitheses obscure 
important hierarchical power relations associated with the denigration of marginalised play which 
only come to light as we deconstruct them. 
 Paradoxically, then, understanding play requires both that we undermine the seriousness/ 
frivolity dichotomy, and that it remains intact to the extent that play can serve as an antidote to the 
excessive constraints of life’s seriousness and such that play can occur at all. As such, it 
(auto)deconstructs. The irreality of play can connote both unseriousness and form the basis of 
immensely serious affective and productive activities, from civilisation to subjectification. This has 
the consequences of exposing the politics of play in the attribution of frivolity by privileged groups 
to the play of marginalised groups. The latters’ engagement in practices of resistance are visible in 
their self-perception as seriously at serious play. As Sutton-Smith notes, his seven rhetorics ‘can be 
examined as a representation of the way people value some kind of play, and also as a 
representation of the way these same people use play to maintain their control by denigrating other 
kinds of play.’147 As Nagel similarly shows, our theories of play must interrogate the politics, 
ideology, and exclusions of existing discourses. Play, she notes, is no longer innocent.148 Huizinga too 
demonstrates an awareness of these disciplinary power relations in his observation that ‘seriousness 
seeks to exclude play, whereas play can very well include seriousness.’149 
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Productive/pointless 
According to Huizinga, a third criterion is that play ‘is superfluous. The need for it is only urgent to 
the extent that the enjoyment of it makes a need… [I]t is never imposed by physical necessity or 
moral duty. It is never a task. It is done at leisure, during “free time”.’150 Caillois espouses a similar 
sentiment: ‘A characteristic of play, in fact, is that it creates no wealth or goods, thus differing from 
work or art.’151 Hackett offers a related evaluation, arguing we should recognise that, ‘as Oscar 
Wilde and W. H. Auden have noted, play is in fact useless, that it makes nothing happen.’152As this 
suggests, play is frequently framed as a leisure activity and an end in itself; as Nagel notes, 
‘[l]eisurely play occurs for its own sake or for relaxation.’153 Such leisurely activity is assumed to be 
undertaken without a substantive goal or purpose. In Ackerman’s analysis, Jeremy Bentham 
concluded that play is pointless from a utilitarian perspective,154 while Hackett concludes: ‘Whether 
it is Mozart or marbles, Shakespeare or soccer, all play forms are equally impractical to the 
immediate needs of life… At times, I have rather casually defined play as everything we do for no 
good reason.’155 Play is thus frequently viewed as without external goal, unproductive, and pointless.  
As was the case with the seriousness/frivolity dichotomy, there have been challenges both 
to this binary’s conventional hierarchy and the binary itself. In the first case, it has been argued that 
while play is indeed opposed to work and productivity, it is valuable for precisely these reasons. In 
this logic, while play is indeed the opposite of work, it comes to occupy the privileged end of the 
binary. This is because, in Ehrmann’s words, ‘it is the gratuitousness, the very uselessness of play, 
which makes it “pure.”’156 In his study of play and games in US culture, Oriard emphasises the degree 
to which play, in contrast to games, rejects the valorisation of work. He explains: 
[P]lay has its own history as well in the cultural rhetoric I am examining, not as an element in 
the “game” but as a rejection of it. To put the case simply: If work has defined official 
cultural values since the 19th century, play has defined the spirit of the perennial 
counterculture. The celebrations of the “game”… have idealized work in various ways; the 
rhetoric of “play” has rejected the cultural pre-eminence of work to envisage utopia.157 
Play can thus be read as a challenge to prevailing idealisations of work and the work ethic. This is 
evident in the frequent association of play with pleasure, relaxation, escape, and retreat. As Fink 
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notes, play ‘is usually defined as “recreation” or “relaxation”… in contrast with serious and 
responsible activities.”158  
 Hans explores some possible reasons for this separation, identifying Marx’s analysis of 
people’s alienation from labour and the ways in which the fruits of work – money and reserve time – 
can be used playfully outside of work itself. He suggests: ‘Play and work become two opposing 
categories with a mediated cause-and-effect relationship: one cannot play while he [sic] works, but 
he can play after work with the money he earned during work. This is one of the most conspicuous 
messages delivered by today’s advertising media.’159 A key dimension of this separation is the 
question of motivation and reward. For Bernard Suits, among others, for an activity to be play it 
must be autotelic, meaning it must be an end in itself, driven by internal rather than external 
motivations. Elaborating on this, Feezell explains: 
[T]he key to play is autotelicity, engaging in activities for their own sake or as ends in 
themselves. This involves the question of the de facto motives, reasons or purposes involved 
when the activities are undertaken… Play requires intrinsic reasons, and if our reason 
(exclusive? predominant?) for doing whatever we choose to do is intrinsic to the activity, it is 
play. Consequently, if games or sports are pursued voluntarily and for intrinsic reasons, they 
are play forms; if they are pursued involuntarily or engaged in predominantly for extrinsic 
reasons, they are not play forms.160 
Opinion varies about whether autotelicity is a necessary or sufficient condition for play: while Suits 
argues for the former, others such as Klaus Meier propose the latter.161 The significance of 
autotelicity for Suits is shown in its central role in his overall definition of play. As Ryall notes, he 
argues that play ‘is a reallocation of resources from instrumental to intrinsic use; for instance, the 
use of a chair as a spaceship, or the use of a sweatshirt as a goal post.’162 Play is thus opposed to 
work as it is aimed not at the production of some instrumental end but rather functions as an end in 
itself.  
In the second case, the productive/pointless binary more fundamentally self-deconstructs. 
Such a disruption is evidenced by Hans in his exploration of the ways in which ways work and play 
interrelate and overlap. People committed to the work ethic, he argues, are frequently 
simultaneously committed to the idea that their work is a form of play. This is reflected in the 
propensity to view forms of work which encompass an element of play as more desirable than those 
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which do not. In Hans’ words, the fact is that ‘people still play on the job no matter how alienated 
they are from their labour; even though the work itself may not be essentially playful, people work 
at making it playful and find ways of doing so.’163 While for Hans, this blurring of the boundaries has 
positive connotations – making work playful – for others, this has problematic consequences. As 
noted above, McKenzie Wark, for example, argues that in the current digital age work becomes 
play.164 Whether for good or ill, then, work and play bleed into each other. In this framing, as this 
suggests, there is a problem framing play as work’s opposite.  
The issue of autotelicity further undermines the productive/pointless binary. In insisting that 
play is intrinsically driven, the issue of motivation is raised. Play is frequently described as being 
animated by a spontaneous energy, separate from the resources demanded and expended in work. 
In Massumi’s account, play is characterised by ‘a surplus: an excess of energy or spirit. This excess is 
felt as a palpable enthusiasm carrying a force of induction, a contagious involvement.’165 Hackett 
suggests something similar in his framing of play ‘as a mere waste product of life, a discharge of 
excess energy, sometimes linked to masturbation.’166 Such an energy is associated with a cathartic 
‘letting off steam’, a ‘line of flight away from a life we find overbearing, absurd or intolerable.’167 In 
Homan’s words, which conjure a comparable experience, play ‘does not expressly fulfil a function, 
but instead arises from the superabundance that is beyond strict utility.’168  
As this suggests, while play defined in these terms may not result in material production of 
the kind associated with work, it is no less productive for that. As Hackett relays, ‘[t]ranscending 
utilitarian considerations and inviting hardship, play brings about the existential satisfaction of 
restoring us to ourselves.’169 Play, in this reading, is far from pointless inasmuch as it has both 
immanent purpose and autonomous meaning. As Fink explains,  
[i]t is frequently said that play is “purposeless” or “undirected” activity. This is not the case. 
Considered as a whole it is purposive and each individual phase of play action has its own 
specific purpose, which is an integral part of the whole. The immanent purpose of play is not 
subordinate to the ultimate purpose served by all other human activity. Play has only 
internal purpose, unrelated to anything external to itself.170 
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Far from being pointless, this ludic excess, he continues, is supremely valuable, albeit in terms other 
than prevailing notions of productivity. As Homan similarly argues, ‘to speak of play as non-
purposive is not to say that it lacks any purpose, rather the activity is its own purpose.’171  
Thus, play both inverts and subverts the productive/pointless binary. In the former case, 
play is elevated to a privileged position to the degree it draws out the problematic qualities of the 
work to which it is conceptually opposed. In the latter challenge, the binary is subverted because 
work can involve or demand play, and because play has an immanent purpose which makes it 
productive, albeit in terms different from prevailing understandings of what counts as purposeful, 
framed in commodified, instrumental terms. Play thus permeates and disrupts the productive/ 
pointless binary, exposing the power relations and politics at work in the devaluation of activities 
not directly related to the interests of production and consumption. Its value, as noted above, is to 
be found in the affective register:  
Although nonnormative, ethico-aesthetic politics is not without criteria of evaluation... 
Given the noncognitive nature of ethico-aesthetic activity, the evaluation necessarily 
pertains to affect… The main criterion available… is the degree to which the political gesture 
carries through enthusiasm of the body. Intensity is the supreme value of this manner of 
politics, for the simple reason that it is experienced as a value in itself… Enthusiasm of the 
body is lived in and for itself, [constituting] an immediate surplus value of life.172 
Massumi demonstrates here the generative qualities of play, which both challenges and subverts the 
association of play with pointlessness. He concludes: ‘What is played is invention. The aesthetic yield 
of play comes with an active mobilization or improvisational powers of variation. Surplus-value of 
life equals surplus-value of inventiveness.’173 This productive capacity of play is echoed by Nietzsche 
in Ecce Homo: ‘I know of no other way of coping with great tasks, than play.’174 In its 
(auto)deconstructive movements, then, play challenges the supposed dominance of the serious, 
exposing and undermining its oppositional hierarchy. 
 
Reason/unreason 
To turn to the final conceptual binary to be discussed in this paper, play is frequently framed as the 
opposite of reason. As was the case with the serious/frivolous binary, Huizinga has an ambiguous 
position on this question. On the one hand, he states:  
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Since the reality of play extends beyond the sphere of human life it cannot have its 
foundations in any rational nexus, because this would limit it to mankind… The very 
existence of play continually confirms the supra-logical nature of the human situation. 
Animals play, so they must be more than merely mechanical things. We play and know that 
we play, so we must be more than merely rational beings, for play is irrational.175  
Here, Huizinga suggests that play cannot be based in reason because animals play, a notion echoed 
by Massumi, Caillois, and others. Ducharme and Fine frame play’s irrationality in terms of the 
peculiar mode of engagement it incites; citing Goffman, they posit that ‘the individual becomes an 
integral part of the situation, lodged in it and exposed to it, infusing himself [sic] into the encounter 
in a way quite different from the way an ideally rational player commits his side to an ideally rational 
game.’176 In creating this alternate nonrational experiential mode, in this framing play functions to 
suspend or defer reason. It precipitates a different form of be(com)ing, suspending the imperative to 
‘strive arduously for knowledge, for excellence and virtue, for fame and honor, for power and 
prosperity.’177 
Yet, on the other hand, Huizinga’s apparent embrace of the irrationality of play is tempered 
by the degree to which his analysis relies upon, and perpetuates, a series of rationalist ontological, 
epistemological, and normative commitments. Nagel identifies the origins of this rationalist 
approach in Aristotle’s treatment of play, framed as ‘Apollonian’, which seeks to discipline and 
jettison the irrational dimensions of play. She introduces her insightful book with the statement: ‘I 
will explore Aristotle’s strategy to eclipse the Dionysian impulse: Play (paidia) becomes the Other (of 
reason)… [Aristotle’s] malediction of play serves as a thread, a guideline for explicating the 
Apollonian tenor in modern play theory.’178 Such a rationalist view is characterised by a desire to 
restrain the more destalibilsing elements of play by emphasising its capacity to generate order and 
affirm dominant cultural tropes. As Huizinga emphasises: ‘Here we come across another, very 
positive feature of play: it creates order, is order. Into an imperfect world and into the confusion of 
life it brings a temporary, limited perfection. Play demands order, absolute and supreme.’179 He 
continues: 
In order that the play-element of civilization be productive of culture or favourable to it, this 
element must be pure. It must not consist in deviation from or in the repudiation of the 
prescribed by reason, humanity or faith… Its spirit and its climate are those of joyous 
exultation, not of wild hysteria.180 
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It is thus necessary for Huizinga, Ehrmann argues, that play is put to work in the service of preserving 
and promoting the existing political and cultural order. In this framing, the analysis proceeds, 
Ehrmann shows, with the assumption of given and fixed context: Huizinga’s (and Caillois’) 
‘formulation of the problem of play makes no allowance for the problem of understanding culture. 
Culture, their idea of culture, is at no time called into question by play. On the contrary, it is given: a 
fixed, stable, pre-existent element, serving as a frame of reference in the evaluation of play.’181 As 
this suggests, this rationalist worldview also posits an a priori player, who is the subject of play. As 
Flint notes, Huizinga ‘sought to gain mastery and control of understandings of play as the grounds 
for the cultivation of cultures, [and] he did so tacitly by means of the classical metaphysical principle 
of being.’182 
These rationalist tendencies, and the accompanying malediction of play, have their roots 
broader trends in Western philosophy and culture. Relaying key elements of Gadamer’s account of 
this process, Hans identifies the ‘shifting traditions of verification in Western culture’ in the 
eighteenth century: ‘the shift away from verification through common sense, authority, and 
prejudgements to verification through some variety of the scientific method.’ He continues: 
Of course, the scientific method itself does not really eliminate verification by common 
sense, authority, and prejudgement, but it does force these factors underground… Now it is 
the scientific method itself – and not the experience of an individual – that determines the 
truth value of a statement. The result of this shift in the method of verification is obvious: 
those activities and disciplines not amenable to verification through reason and the scientific 
methods lose their status as having truth value… The arts have been relegated to this status, 
according to Gadamer, for exactly the same reasons play becomes peripheral.183 
Hans’ claim here is that the rise of reason as a core element of the scientific method is linked to the 
devaluation of forms of knowledge resistant to empirical testing and falsification. The ensuing claim 
that methodological processes are the only legitimate path to knowledge initiates the banishment of 
play as incommensurable with, and, as I will discuss in the Conclusion, a danger to, reason. 
Importantly, the malediction of play though its association with unreason corresponds to a series of 
broader power relations: it is linked to the reification of a particular form of philosophy reserved for 
specific privileged groups and the devaluation of practices associated with subjugated social groups. 
Reflecting this point, Nagel identifies the gendered, racialised, and elitist consequences of play’s 
relegation to the sphere of unreason in Aristotle’s thought: ‘philosophy is not a game, not a trivial 
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matter, which can be pursued by women or children or nonpropertied men (i.e. the masses or 
subaltern subjects).’184   
 Play thus becomes, in Nagel’s terms ‘ideologically suspect’. She explains: ‘Agitating in this 
process of abjection, we encounter “serious” thinkers who denounce play as an unworthy, childish, 
irrational, superficial activity.’185 Such thinkers come to revile play to the degree that it ‘has come to 
be the Other of reason.’186 In her reading, which draws up and develops Spariosu’s study, Western 
philosophy since Socrates has served to discipline and devalue play. In Spariosu’s words, 
‘[p]hilosophy sets itself the task of subduing poetry, of imposing upon it a spiritual world of order, 
clarity, and permanence, a world of rationality and morality – the world of Being in the Platonic 
sense.’187 Originating in the pre-Socratic struggle between what he calls ‘archiac’ and ‘median’ forces 
– the former corresponding broadly to Dionysian irrationality and the latter Apollonian reason – 
Spariosu argues that Western philosophy continues to be characterised by this agonism: 
Although Plato and Aristotle convert heroic and tragic poetry into “fiction” or “literature,” 
subordinating it to the serious and moral truth of metaphysics, the ancient agon between 
the poets and philosophers comes back again and again to haunt Western thought… Faced 
with this challenge of threat, the modern philosophers may react in two ways: they either 
reenact the Platonic suppression of prerational values, relegating them again to the realm of 
“mere” art and play (in the case of Kant); or they wholeheartedly embrace these values, 
turning literature or art into an effective weapon against their own philosophical opponents 
(the case of the artist-metaphysicians) [Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida].188  
This statement is important as it indicates the extent to which challenges posed by Nietzsche and his 
inheritors may be read as marking the return of the Dionysian play feared, and consequently 
banished, by the Apollonian tenor of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and much of modern Western 
philosophy. Such a return indicates that this attempted banishment has been ultimately 
unsuccessful; Nietzsche has been described as ‘the first dancing philosopher,’189 while Derrida holds 
claim to be ‘perhaps the most playful’ of figures explored in Spariosu’s category of philosophical 
artist-metaphysicians.190 Play’s (auto)deconstructive tendency thus challenges the supremacy of 
reason, exposing the politics and power relations at work in the devaluation of knowledge and being 
which cannot be apprehended in rational terms.  
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Conclusion 
This article has argued that play is at work in international theory. Utilising Derrida’s thought, I have 
shown that that play deconstructs itself in the process of attempted conceptualisation, and that the 
radical reflexivity of this (auto)deconstructive capacity has significant value for challenging 
hegemonic concepts and forces in global politics. To substantiate this claim, by deconstructing core 
elements of Huizinga’s foundational text, the paper has shown that play resists stable 
conceptualisation in binary terms, frustrating attempts to offer a useful working definition. 
However, my claim is that its theoretical and political potential inheres in precisely this resistance. 
By refusing to obediently come to rest in one or another conceptual pole, play allows us to glimpse a 
relational movement which highlights the politics at stake in the Western philosophy’s malediction 
of play. It is as though the devalued end of each binary playfully speaks back to the politics inscribing 
the devaluation, pushing towards both the privileged side and/or its broader subversion.  
 Importantly, as noted above, the play of deconstruction has provoked considerable unease 
in the Western philosophical tradition. As Hans notes,  
[o]ur own tradition has the need to legitimize a ground or origin for play, something that 
would remove the anxiety inherent in an activity to which we must wholly give ourselves. 
The need for security and for play regularly come into conflict, with the result that we have 
tried to ground play and make it safe. But this desire to ground play is borne of an attitude 
that has always characterized play as a peripheral activity.191  
I would argue that such an anxiety, Cartesian in nature, is at work in the Apollonian devaluation of 
play this article has set out. Furthermore, I would suggest that play, of both signifiers and concepts 
more generally, is a key means by which the power relations associated with this anxiety may be 
exposed and challenged. As Hackett argues, play, ‘which at first glance seems so wasteful and 
insignificant, turns out to the realm of life best suited to objectifying and confronting our existential 
apprehensions, for the freedom and courage necessary to play is also the freedom and courage 
necessary to being.’192 
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